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2

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1)

Whether Appellant Greg Hansen timely filed his appeal of the
November 16th, 2004 order on May 18th, 2005?
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 requires a Notice of Appeal to be filed
within 30 days of the judgment or order appealed from, with a possible 30 day
extension.

2)

Whether, assuming the appeal was timely filed, the trial court
incorrectly applied the law in allowing a judgment to be enforced
despite claims of limitations, thus applying the equitable version of the
Discovery Rule?
a) This issue was preserved in the trial court, at R. 80-85
b) The standard of review for statute of limitations questions and the
application of the Discovery Rule is a question of law, and this Court need
show no deference to the trial court. Russell Packard Development, Inc. v.
Carson; 2005 UT 14 f 18.
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3)

Did the Trial Court correctly place the burden of proof on the
wrongdoer to suffer imprecise damages?
a) This issue was preserved at the trial court at Tr. 1-2.
b) The standard of review is whether there was a rational basis for the damage
award; Rees v. Intermountain Health Care Inc.; 808 P.2d 1069, 1079 (Utah
1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO VISIONS

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-22 Statute of Limitations ~ Eight years.
An action may be brought within eight years upon a judgment or decree of any
court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1)

This action arose from a divorce matter. Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen
and Respondent/Appellee Julie Kik were married on June 27th, 1976 and
divorced in the Sixth District Court on November 15th, 1994. R. 60-66.

2)

On September 30th, 2004 Julie Kik filed an Order to show cause to enforce
certain parts of the Divorce decree, namely transfer of equity and personal
property to her. R. 70-75

3)

On October 22, 2004 the trial court held a hearing on the Motion, and heard
testimony from Julie Kik, Greg Hansen and their daughter Christie. R. 8687.

4)

On November 15th, 2004 the Honorable Paul D. Lyman entered his Order
on Order to Show Cause and Judgment; ordering Petitioner Greg Hansen to
pay to Respondent Julie Kik $4,000 for equity and an additional amount for
personal property, leaving both sides responsible for their own attorney's
fees. R. 89-94.

5)

On April 21, 2005 Respondent/Appellee Julie Kik moved the trial court to
correct a clerical error in the judgment. The trial court issued an Amended
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgment on May 5th, 2005 but ordered
it to be entered nunc pro tunc on November 15th, 2004. R. 125-129.
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6)

Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hanson filed his notice of appeal on May 18th,
2005. R. 139-140.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1)

Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen and Respondent/Appellee Julie Kik were
married on June 27th, 1976 and divorced in the Sixth District Court on
November 15th, 1994. R. 60-66.

2)

In the divorce decree, Julie Kik was awarded a lien of $4,000 against the
real property of the marital estate, with no timeline to execute that lien. Id.

3)

Appellee Julie Kik was also awarded certain items of marital property, but
allowed to store them at Appellant Greg Hansen's property for a time. Id.

4)

Greg Hansen eventually gave some items of that personal property to her,
but not most of it. This was around 1999. R. 89-94.

5)

When Respondent/Appellee Julie Kik would ask for her property, she
testified she was intimidated by Appellant Greg Hansen. Tr. 34.

6)

On September 30th, 2004 Julie Kik filed an Order to show cause to enforce
certain parts of the Divorce decree, namely to receive her lien amount of
$4000, and her remaining personal property. R. 70-75
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7)

On October 22, 2004 the trial court held a hearing on the Motion, and heard
testimony from Julie Kik, Greg Hansen and their daughter Christie. R. 8687.

8)

On November 15th, 2004 the Honorable Paul D. Lyman entered his Order
on Order to Show Cause and Judgment; ordering Petitioner Greg Hansen to
pay to Respondent Julie Kik $4,000 for equity and an additional amount for
personal property, leaving both sides responsible for their own attorney's
fees. R. 89-94.

9)

The Court, at the November 15, 2004, hearing found major inconsistencies
in the Petitioner's testimony and most of what he testified to was
questionable. The Court also found that the Petitioner's sworn affidavit
was inconsistent with his testimony at trial. R. 89-94.

10)

On April 21, 2005 Respondent/Appellee Julie Kik moved the trial court to
correct a clerical error in the judgment. The trial court issued an Amended
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgment on May 5th, 2005 but ordered
it to be entered nunc pro tunc on November 15th, 2004. R. 125-129.

11)

Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hanson filed his notice of appeal on May 18th,
2005. R. 139-140.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen has not timely filed his appeal; rather
filing it 5 months late. He bases his time for appeal on an Amended Order, but that
Order was nunc pro tunc, as it made no material changes. Therefore, his appeal is
5 months late and untimely, and should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
However, if he did file his appeal on time, Appellee Julie Kik was not
outside the statute of limitations when she filed her Order to show cause. Statute
of limitations are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. The 8 year statute of
limitation begins to run from when the judgment is breached, not when it is
entered. To hold otherwise would be to eviscerate judicial liens, alimony, child
support, and other awards. In this case, the time when the judgment was breached
was around 1999, and thus, the statute of limitations would run from then, and
Appellee Julie Kik was in plenty of time.
Even if the statute of limitations runs from the date of entry, it was tolled by
the discovery rule. And the trial court had a rational basis for its damage awards.
Therefore, Appellee Julie Kik asks this Court to dismiss Appellant Greg Hansen's
appeal for untimeliness, and to uphold the trial courts ruling.
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ARGUMENT

I.

DID PETITIONER/APPELLANT GREG HANSEN

TIMELY APPEAL?
It is clear that this appeal should be dismissed for being untimely. The final
Order being appealed from was entered on November 16th, 2004, and the Notice
of Appeal was not filed until May 18th, 2005, a total time of over 6th months.
Utah R. App. Procedure 4 allows a time period of 30 days to file a Notice of
Appeal from a final order. Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen's appeal is clearly
untimely, and should be stricken.
There have been no post order motions that would toll the time period, thus
saving the time for appeal.
Petitioner Greg Hansen relies on the fact that the trial court did grant a
motion to amend the Order on May 5th 2005. If May 5th, 2005 is the time when
the final order was issued, then the appeal was timely, if not, it should be
dismissed. The Amended Order on Order to Show Cause was by its own terms
effective as of November 16th, 2004, not May 5th, 2005.
The Motion to Amend was to correct a clerical error. R. 112-115. The trial
court issued it nunc pro tunc, related back to the date of the original judgment,
November 16th, 2004.
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The rule governing amended judgments is clearly laid out:
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an amendment or
modification not changing the substance or character of the judgment,
such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the
time the original judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the time
for appeal; but where the modification or amendment is in some
material matter, the time begins to run from the time of the
modification or amendment.

State v. Kelly Lafe Gamer; 2005 UT 6, |11 (quoting Adamson v.
Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947)). Thus, the materiality of the
modifications is crucial.
In this case, the change was minor, and did not change the substance or
character of the judgment. Paragraph 9 of the findings and Paragraph 1 of the
Order were changed by one word each. In each case, the Petitioner was
mistakenly substituted for Respondent in the beginning of the paragraph. The
Amended Order reads as follows:
[Paragraph 9 of the Findings]The Respondent should be awarded
judgment for the value of the personal property items on Exhibit No. 1
for a total of $8,172. The Petitioner should receive a credit against this
sum for the reasonable costs of storage of the items in the sum of
$1,320. The Respondent should then be awarded a judgment against
the Petitioner in the sum of $6,855, which represents the value of the
personal property awarded to her in the decree.
[Paragraph one of the OrderjThe Respondent is awarded judgment for
the value of the personal property items on Exhibit No. 1 for a total of
$8,172. The Petitioner shall receive a credit against this sum for the
reasonable costs of storage of the items in the sum of $1,320. The
Respondent is then awarded the judgment against the Petitioner in the
sum of $6,855, which shall bear interest at the statutory rate until paid
in full, which represents the value of the personal property awarded to
her in the decree.
Hansen v. Kik, Appellee's Brief
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The bold word in each paragraph was changed from the word "Petitioner" in
the Amended Order on Order to Show Cause. This change is clearly not a
material change, for even if the order had remained unchanged, each paragraph is
applying a formula, and only can be interpreted as ultimately awarding the
Respondent Julie Kik $6,855.
The trial court simply took the total value of the personal property items,
subtracted the Petitioner Greg Hansen's storage cost, and then awarded the
Respondent Julie Kik the value remaining. Whether the original value of the
personal property items was awarded to Greg Hansen or Julie Kik (all the
Amended Order corrected), the value was reduced by the storage fees and the
remaining value was clearly awarded to Julie Kik. Thus, it is not a material
change at all, for the final award, and the figures involved, were not changed in the
slightest.
Petitioner Hansen was not harmed or otherwise had his duties changed by
this amended order—it was simply a clerical mistake. Thus, the amendment was
properly related back to the time of original entry by the trial court, and
Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen's appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.
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II.

ASSUMING A TIMELY APPEAL, THE TRIAL COURT

PROPERLY ALLOWED THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO
PROCEED
Assuming that Petitioner Greg Hansen timely filed his Appeal, it is clear
that the Trial court properly applied the statute of limitations in this case. Statute
of limitations and discovery rule questions are questions of law, and are reviewed
for correctness. Russell Packard Development Inc. v. Carson; 2005 UT 14, ^f 18.
Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen's main argument on appeal is that of
statute of limitations. He contends that the Order to show cause was filed outside
the proper limitations period, and thus the trial court should be reversed, and the
judgment against him overturned. This is not so, the trial court correctly applied
the law.
The appropriate limitations period in this case is 8 years, as found in Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-22: "An action may be brought within eight years upon a
judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory
within the United States." The original judgment in this case was entered on
November 15th, 1994, while the Order to Show cause was filed on September
30th, 2004. Clearly, this was 9 years after the judgment was issued.
Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen argues that therefore, the Order on Order to
show Cause and Judgment was improperly issued against him. He relies heavily
on Kessimakis v. Kessimakis; 1999 UT App 130.
Hansen v. Kik, Appellee's Brief
Page 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As a threshold matter, a statute of limitations begins to run when the last
element of the cause of action finally accrues. Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14 at
f20. The question is, therefore, when did the statute start running in this case?
Appellant Greg Hansen contends it started the day the decree was entered. This
simply makes no sense, however, for if the rule was that you could only sue on a
judgment 8 years after it was entered, regardless of the terms of the judgment, then
alimony, child support, etc would be effectively limited to 8 years. This is not the
case. It would be a poor rule indeed, if child support could cease on the 8th
anniversary of the entry of the final order, regardless of the age of the child (who
may not even be 8 yet).
The.rule must simply be the same as any other statute of limitation: once
the action for a breach of the judgment arises, you have 8 years to make your
claim, regardless of when the actual judgment was entered.
Therefore, the question is—when did the 8 years start to run in this case?
The trial court stated there was no deadline for the Petitioner, Greg Hansen, to
abide by. Nevertheless, there are some time frames to work with. The original
divorce decree was interpreted by the trial court to require Petitioner Greg Hansen
to deliver personal property to Julie Kik. Order on Order to show cause, f 1, R. 90.
The testimony of Greg Hansen was that he finally delivered property around five
years later, in 1999 or so. Id. at ]fl2. At that point, Julie Kik knew or should have
known that she would never see her personal property, and the 8 years should start
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from that time. Her Order to Show Cause is clearly within the 8 year limit from
1999.
As for the delivery of equity in the household, there was no time limit given
in the original divorce decree. It simply awarded equity in real property to Julie
Kik, the respondent, and stated that upon payment of $4,000 by Greg Hansen, she
would therefore no longer have any equity. R. 61, ^[4. In other words, she had a
lien on the property in the amount of $4,000. The trial court found this has never
been paid. R. 89-94.
This lien puts this case squarely in line with Coulon v. Coulon; 915 P.2d
1069 (Utah App. 1996). In that case, the parties were divorced in 1983, and the
husband had a lien for a certain amount of money on real property. He filed an
order to show cause in 1994, well past the 8 year statute of limitations if taken
from the date of judgment. The Coulon court, while discussing the 8 year statute
of limitations in the context of child support payments, never mentions that the
order was late; clearly it was entirely appropriate. Coulon is an incredibly
important case, not least because it shows that the 8 year statute of limitations runs
from the time the judgment is breached, not entered.
Compared with Kessimakis v. Kessimakis; 1999 UT App 130, the case
Appellant Greg Hansen relies on, it is clear that several principles emerge.
Kessimakis was a case where the wife was awarded an interest in a corporation,
but was paid for her interest. The Court decided that the 8 year statute of
limitations barred her receiving the evidence of transfer of the interest, but did not
Hansen v. Kik, Appellee's Brief
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discuss when her claim arose. Clearly, it arose at the time of the entry of
judgment, since the judgment created the transfer immediately, and thus the
evidence of that transfer was available immediately.
In contrast, in this case the 1994 divorce decree did not create any duties to
immediate transfer. The personal property was not ordered transferred by a time
certain; in fact, it was allowed to stay at Greg Hansen's house. The lien falls
under Coulon, as explained earlier. Furthermore, the facts in Kessimakis are
distinguishable from the present matter in several ways. First, in Kessimakis, the
Court specifically concluded that Mr. Kessimakis had not done anything that
would operate or toll or stay the statute of limitations, nor had he lulled Ms.
Kessimakis into inactivity. Id at 1228. In the present matter, the Court found the
Petitioner's testimony not credible, but also that the Respondent had made
reasonable efforts and demands for her personal property and that the Petitioner
had failed, neglected, or refused to make the personal items available to her. R.
89-94. Kessimakis is simply not applicable.
It's clear that Appellee Julie Kik simply had no cause of action to have the
statute run on until around 1999. The lien on the property is like any other lien—it
can be foreclosed at any time. The personal property was delivered in 1999—and
then discovered to be incomplete, at which point the cause of action arose, and the
8 years started running. The trial court basically agreed, when it stated there was
no "judgment" and no "time limit," when it addressed the statute of limitations and
laches issues. Tr. 67.
Hansen v. Kik, Appellee's Brief
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Even if the limitations period did run, the ''Discovery rule" would step in
and toll the statute of limitations. Russell Packard Development Inc. v. Carson;
2005 UT 14, decided this year, is the leading case on statutes of limitation and the
discovery rule. The 8-year limitations period has an equitable discovery rule, and
this case fits under f30 of Russell Packard. Basically, assuming that Julie Kik was
out of the limitations period, if she can show that the reasonable person would
have delayed filing, then the limitations period is tolled until discovery, which as
established above was 1999.
While the trial court made no explicit findings, the testimony was that Julie
Kik was intimidated and bullied by Greg Hansen, and she didn't want to involve
her minor children in another court battle. Tr. 34. This clearly was persuasive to
the finder of fact. Thus, the Discovery rule should apply and toll the statute of
limitations, and the order to show cause was timely filed.
i

III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PLACED THE ISSUE

OF IMPRECISE DAMAGES ON THE WRONGDOER, GREG
HANSEN
Petitioner/Appellant argues that the amount of damages awarded against
him for the personal property is based on "guesses" and is "speculation." He
argues that damages cannot be based on speculation alone, citing DUNN v.
McKAY, BURTON,

MCMURRAY

& THURMAN; 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978).

Hansen v. Kik, Appellee's Brief
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While damages cannot be only based on speculation, the rule is stated quite well in
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah App. 1989):
We note that in the context of a damage award, a trial court's findings
of fact must provide a sufficient basis for this court to determine
whether there is a rational legal basis as well as a sufficient factual
basis for the award of damages. See, e.g., Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d
953, 957 (Utah 1983). However,
[although an award of damages based only on speculation cannot be
upheld, it is generally recognized that some degree of uncertainty in the
evidence of damages will not suffice to relieve a defendant from
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as there is some rational
basis for a damage award, it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk
of some uncertainty. Where there is evidence of the fact of damage, a
defendant may not escape liability because the amount of damage
cannot be proved with precision.
Id. at 956 (emphasis added).
Further. f,[o]nce a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss,
... the reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of a
loss is generally lower than that required to establish the fact or cause
of a loss." Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Wamick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah
1983) (citations omitted). 'The amount of damages may be based upon
approximations, if the fact of damage is established, and the
approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or projections."
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d
330, 336 (Utah 1985).

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah App. 1989)(Several citations
omitted). This quote quite clearly is dispositive; for the trial court carefully
examined the little evidence he had, and drew from his own experience where
possible to see that the claimed damages were reasonable. Tr. 68-70. In addition,
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the Trial Court found major inconsistencies in the Petitioner's testimony, that most
of what he testified to at trial was questionable and that the Petitioner's sworn
affidavit was inconsistent with his testimony at trial. R. 89-94. There is a rational
basis for the award of damages, and thus, it should be upheld.
As for attorney's fees, Appellee Julie Kik notes that Appellant Greg Hansen
is essentially asking for sanctions, which is clearly not applicable. Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure only applies in this case to Appellant Greg
Hansen. And Appellee Julie Kik has made her arguments both in the trial court
and in this Court in good faith. Nor has Appellee forced Appellant Greg Hansen
to pursue this appeal by winning at the trial court.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner/Appellant Greg Hansen has not timely filed his appeal; rather
filing it 5 months late. Therefore, his appeal should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
However, if he did file his appeal on time, Julie Kik was not outside the
statute of limitations when she filed her Order to show cause. The 8 year statute
of limitation begins to run from when the judgment is breached, not when it is
entered. To hold otherwise would be to eviscerate judicial liens, alimony, child
support, and other awards.
Even if the statute of limitations runs from the date of entry, it was tolled by
the discovery rule. And the trial court had a rational basis for its damage awards.
Hansen v. Kik, Appellee's Brief
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Therefore, Appellee Julie Kik asks this Court to dismiss Appellant Greg Hansen's
appeal for untimeliness, and to uphold the trial courts ruling.

DATED this T day of January, 2006

Douglas IirNeeley
Attorney for Appelle

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on this [g_ day of January, 2006,1 mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, postage prepaid, to Andrew B.
Berrry, Attorney for Appellant, at P.O. Box 600, Moroni, Utah, 84646.
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